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Abstract
If reward-associated cues acquire the properties of incentive stimuli they can come to powerfully control behavior, and
potentially promote maladaptive behavior. Pavlovian incentive stimuli are defined as stimuli that have three fundamental
properties: they are attractive, they are themselves desired, and they can spur instrumental actions. We have found,
however, that there is considerable individual variation in the extent to which animals attribute Pavlovian incentive
motivational properties (‘‘incentive salience’’) to reward cues. The purpose of this paper was to develop criteria for
identifying and classifying individuals based on their propensity to attribute incentive salience to reward cues. To do this,
we conducted a meta-analysis of a large sample of rats (N=1,878) subjected to a classic Pavlovian conditioning procedure.
We then used the propensity of animals to approach a cue predictive of reward (one index of the extent to which the cue
was attributed with incentive salience), to characterize two behavioral phenotypes in this population: animals that
approached the cue (‘‘sign-trackers’’) vs. others that approached the location of reward delivery (‘‘goal-trackers’’). This
variation in Pavlovian approach behavior predicted other behavioral indices of the propensity to attribute incentive salience
to reward cues. Thus, the procedures reported here should be useful for making comparisons across studies and for
assessing individual variation in incentive salience attribution in small samples of the population, or even for classifying
single animals.
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Introduction
If the impending receipt or availability of a desirable item (a
rewarding unconditioned stimulus, US) is signaled by a cue, the
cue itself can acquire a number of properties. Best known is the
ability to act as a conditioned stimulus (CS), evoking a response
(conditioned response; CR) that formerly was elicited only by
receipt of the reward itself. Thus, as described by Pavlov [1], a cue
that is paired with delivery of food to a hungry dog can come to
evoke salivation prior to receipt of the food. However, a Pavlovian
cue can also acquire more complex psychological properties. Of
particular interest here is the ability of a Pavlovian cue to directly
activate emotional and motivational states, influencing behavior
via its properties as an incentive stimulus [2,3,4,5,6]. But, how
does one know if a ‘‘cold’’, informational CS also acquires the
properties of a ‘‘hot’’ incentive stimulus, and thus has the ability to
incite and motivate actions?
Operationally, Pavlovian incentive stimuli are defined as stimuli
that have three fundamental properties [4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13].
First, incentive stimuli bias attention towards them and are
attractive - individuals approach them. This feature of an incentive
stimulus will often bring an individual into close proximity with the
associated reward. Second, incentive stimuli themselves become
objects of desire (‘wanted’), in the sense that individuals will work
to get them, and they can even reinforce learning a new
instrumental response to get them (i.e., they act as conditioned
or secondary reinforcers). This feature of an incentive stimulus can
sometimes motivate persistent reward-seeking behavior for long
periods of time in the absence of the reward itself. Finally,
incentive stimuli can generate a conditioned motivational state
that can goad or spur renewed seeking for the associated reward.
In the case of drug-associated cues, this feature of an incentive
stimulus may produce craving and/or relapse, despite a conscious
intent to maintain abstinence. Experimentally, each of these three
properties of an incentive stimulus can be assessed using well-
established procedures, including Pavlovian conditioned approach
(PCA), conditioned reinforcement and Pavlovian-to-instrumental
transfer (PIT) or reinstatement procedures.
Importantly, there is considerable individual variation in the
extent to which a Pavlovian CS acquires the properties of an
incentive stimulus. For example, it has long been known that only
some animals come to approach a reward cue [i.e., show what has
been called a sign-tracking CR; 14,15]. Indeed, Zener [16]
described such individual variation seventy-five years ago during
experiments in which the ringing of a bell was paired with food
delivery in unrestrained dogs. He noted that after learning the
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2association between the CS and US, the topography of the CR
varied considerably from animal to animal. Some dogs exhibited a
‘‘small but definite movement of approach toward the conditioned
stimulus . . . followed by a backing up later to a position to eat’’.
However, other dogs showed ‘‘an initial glance at the bell’’
followed by ‘‘a constant fixation . . . to the food-pan . . .’’, and yet
others vacillated, looking back and forth between the bell and the
food pan. Similar findings were later described in other species,
including rats, and these cue- vs. goal location-directed behaviors
were termed ‘‘sign-tracking’’ and ‘‘goal-tracking’’ CRs, respec-
tively [15,17,18,19,20,21,22,23].
We have recently reported that the propensity to approach a
food cue also predicts the extent to which the cue acquires other
properties of an incentive stimulus. In rats that develop a strong
sign-tracking CR (‘‘sign-trackers’’; STs), the CS is also a more
effective conditioned reinforcer [9,24,25] and produces greater
reinstatement [26], than in rats that do not approach the CS, but
instead learn to approach the food cup (‘‘goal-trackers’’; GTs).
Furthermore, based on their propensity to approach a food cue,
we can predict, prior to any experience with drugs, in which
individuals drug cues will come to powerfully control and motivate
behavior [27,28,29,30,31].
These studies have led us to suggest that individual differences
in the extent to which food and drug cues acquire the properties of
an incentive stimulus reflect an underlying complex psychological
trait, which we define as the propensity to attribute incentive salience to
reward cues. Here, we use the term ‘‘psychological trait’’ to denote a
psychological process that has several behavioral manifestations,
and ‘‘behavioral phenotype’’ as a measureable manifestation of
this psychological trait. Therefore, although the classification of
the ST and GT behavioral phenotypes is based on their
performance on a Pavlovian approach test, it is important to note
that sign- vs. goal-tracking behavior are but one manifestation of
the underlying psychological trait, which can be assessed using
different tests to determine if a cue is attributed with incentive
salience (tests of approach, conditioned reinforcement and
reinstatement).
In our previous studies on individual variation in the expression
of sign- vs. goal-tracking behavior, we characterized relatively
small numbers of rats in any given experiment, using their
tendency to sign-track as a phenotypic index of psychological trait
variability. However, it is difficult to determine the prevalence and
characteristics of such phenotypes in the population using small
samples. To better achieve this aim we have pooled data from
multiple studies in which animals were tested under nearly
identical conditions. Thus, we report here analyses based on data
from 1,878 rats tested for conditioned approach using a standard
Pavlovian (i.e. ‘‘autoshaping’’) procedure (see Materials and
Methods), providing a good estimate of variation in these
behaviors in the population. Our goals were two-fold: (1) to better
characterize individual variation in learning a ST CR vs. GT CR,
as an index of the propensity to attribute incentive salience to a
food cue, and (2) develop a metric to classify and compare
individual animals, based on their performance relative to a large
sample of the population.
Results
Marked individual variation in the propensity to
approach a lever-CS vs. the food cup after Pavlovian
training in rats
Fig. 1 illustrates that there is enormous individual variation in
the extent to which rats learn to approach and engage a lever-CS
vs. the food cup after 5 sessions of CS-US pairing (Pavlovian
training). These figures include data from all rats, before they were
classified into behavioral phenotypes as described below. It is
readily evident that some animals vigorously engage the lever-CS,
whereas others do not. Conversely, some animals approach and
engage the food cup during the CS period, and rarely make
contact with the lever-CS.
An Index of Pavlovian Conditioned Approach (PCA)
Behavior and Calculation of a PCA Score
In our initial studies, using relatively small samples, we classified
animals as STs or GTs using a ‘‘rank-order split’’ method —
dividing the sample into thirds based on the absolute number of
lever-CS deflections after training [e.g., 9,32,33]. There are two
potential problems with this approach. First, in any small sample
the distribution may be skewed towards one phenotype or the
other, and simply dividing the sample into thirds may result in
misclassifying individuals, and also result in very different
performance criteria from one experiment to the next. Second,
this way of classifying animals ignores other aspects of conditioned
approach, which is a broad term that can be measured in multiple
ways. For example, our previous method did not include the
degree of interaction with the food-cup (i.e., goal-tracking) when
classifying individual rats, even though most animals engage in
both sign- and goal-tracking to some extent. Furthermore, some
rats may approach the cue or food cup quickly, but not necessarily
engage it vigorously, or may respond only on a portion of trials.
Because these three aspects of approach may be expressed to
different degrees in individual animals, we routinely measure (a)
the number of lever deflections and food cup head entries during
Figure 1. Individual variation in the propensity to approach the
lever-CS or food cup after 5 days of Pavlovian training. The
number of lever deflections (A) and food cup entries (B) is shown for
1,878 individual rats (Subject Number), with the order of the cases
randomized so the values are not clustered. Note that there is
enormous individual variation in the preferred response.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038987.g001
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entering the food cup during the CS period on each trial (defined
as the number of trials with a lever press or food cup entry, divided
by the total number of trials), and (c) the latency to the first lever
deflection or food cup entry. Using these measures we devised a
‘‘PCA Score’’, as follows. From the CS lever deflections and CS
food cup entries, we calculated three measures of approach: 1)
Response Bias (ratio of lever presses and food cup entries in relation
to total number of responses), 2) Probability Difference (the difference
between the probability of pressing the lever and the probability of
entering the food cup), and 3) Latency Score (difference between the
latencies to approach the lever and the food cup). Averaging these
three measures of approach produces a PCA Score for each
individual, on each day of training. Scores derived this way range
from 21t o+1, whereby scores of 21 and +1 indicate strong
biases toward goal-tracking and sign-tracking, respectively, and a
score of zero indicates that the two responses are equally
distributed. Table 1 describes these calculations in detail. We also
measured the number of food cup head entries during the inter-
trial interval (ITI), but these are not included as part of the PCA
Score.
Fig. 2 shows the distributions of each of the three component
measures of approach and Fig. 3 shows the distribution of the PCA
Scores, on each of five days of training. It is clear from Figs. 2 and
3 that the PCA Scores and its three component measures were
skewed towards negative numbers (goal-tracking) on Day 1 of
training. This bias toward the goal is probably because animals
were pre-trained to retrieve food from the food cup for 1–2 days
prior to Pavlovian training. However, by Days 4 and 5 of
Pavlovian training two subpopulations became evident. For the
Response Bias and Probability Difference scores (Fig. 2), peaks
associated with these subpopulations occurred at the extremes of
the measurement scale, because rats that engaged exclusively in
sign- or goal-tracking on all trials would get a score of +1o r21,
respectively, regardless of how many lever or magazine contacts
occurred or how quickly they occurred. However, for the Latency
Score this is not the case, because rats could respond with varying
latencies even though they may have responded on every trial.
The unique distribution of Latency Score is one rationale for its
inclusion in the PCA index, as it may reflect an aspect of approach
not captured by the other measures. Because two divergent
subpopulations were clearly evident by Days 4–5 of training, and
because the index component scores were highly correlated on
these days (r’s.0.90), we chose to use the average of the PCA
Scores from Days 4 and 5 to produce what we call the PCA Index
Score, and this is what is used to classify animals as STs, GTs or
Intermediates (INs). Of course, other researchers could choose to
classify animals based on only one component measure, which is
why we provide all the data on this large sample of animals.
Correlations between Sign-tracking, Goal-tracking and
the PCA Score
Table 2 shows correlations between the number of CS lever
presses, CS food cup entries, and ITI food cup entries. On day 1,
CS lever presses and CS food cup entries were weakly inversely
correlated (r=20.18), and this correlation became moderately
strong by day 5 (r=20.58). This suggests that the inverse
relationship between sign- and goal-tracking increased with
training. This is consistent with the segregation of individuals into
subpopulations, including one that predominately engages in sign-
tracking and another that predominately goal-tracks upon cue
presentation. Further, although the number of lever presses was
not correlated with ITI magazine entries on day 1, there was a
weak inverse correlation between these measures by day 5
(r=20.25). In contrast, a strong correlation between CS and
ITI food cup entries on day 1 (r=0.74) was weaker by day 5
(r=0.47). These correlations suggest that this segregation of STs
and GTs is not explained by differences in general exploratory
behavior, as indicated by the weak associations between ITI
magazine entries and sign- and goal-tracking (see also Fig. 9, and
Fig. 3 in Robinson and Flagel, [9]). The PCA Score, on the other
hand, as shown in Fig. 4, accounts for a substantial amount of the
variance in both CS lever presses (Fig. 4A and 4B) and magazine
entries (Fig. 4C and 4D) on Day 5, but less so on Day 1 of training.
Analysis of Vacillation to Determine Classification Criteria
To characterize subpopulations of rats that engaged preferen-
tially in sign- or goal-tracking on Days 4 and 5, we plotted lever-
and goal-directed behavior on a trial-by-trial basis for a subset of
rats (n=370). This subset contained data from rats tested by two
investigators in our laboratory (PJM and BTS). Specifically, we
characterized the degree of vacillation, or switching between these
behaviors, by calculating the percentage of trials in which only a
lever press or only a food cup entry occurred (‘‘ONLY’’ trials). Of
course, it was possible for an animal to make both a lever deflection
and a magazine entry during any given 8 sec CS period (trial).
Thus, the percentage of trials in which a rat engaged in both
behaviors (‘‘BOTH’’ trials), and the percentage of trials in which
no response occurred (‘‘NONE’’ trials) was also determined.
Fig. 5 shows the percentage of ONLY (panel A) and BOTH
(Panel B) trials for individual animals, plotted as a function of their
Table 1. Formulas for deriving the PCA Index Score.
Response Bias =(Lever Presses – Food Cup Entries)/(Lever Presses+Food Cup Entries)
Probability Difference =p|Lever Press – p|Cup Entry
Latency Score =(x ¯ Cup Entry Latency – x ¯ Lever Press Latency)/8
PCA Score(n) =[Response Bias(n)+Latency Score(n)+Probability Difference(n)]/3
PCA Index Score =[PCA Score (4)+PCA Score (5)]/2
(n)=any particular test session.
x ¯ =averaged Latency.
p|=probability.
Legend: The overall PCA Index Score, used for phenotype classification (see Fig. 6), was derived by averaging the individual PCA Scores for Days 4 and 5 of training. The
PCA Score for each session was derived by averaging the three individual measures (Response Bias, Probability Difference, and Latency Score) for that particular session.
Responses Bias is a proportion of lever presses/food cup entries in relation to the total number of responses. The Probability Difference was derived by subtracting the
probability of food cup entries from the probability of lever presses. Latency score was the (averaged) difference between latencies to make food cup and lever
responses (divided by the length of the CS duration; in this case 8 s).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038987.t001
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shows the Response Bias score, Panel B the Probability Difference score and Panel C the Latency score. The number of rats with a given PCA Score are
binned into 20 bins of equal size (0.1 bin sizes), according to their score, which ranges from +1t o21. Thus, the vertical axis shows the number of rats
in each bin, and the horizontal axis the PCA Score. Note that the Response Bias score and the Probability Difference score show the development of
two subpopulations by Days 4 and 5 of training.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038987.g002
Figure 3. The distribution of PCA Scores across each of the 5 days of Pavlovian training, using the formula given in Table 1. The
number of rats are binned according to their PCA Scores, which ranges from +1t o21, with 0.1 bin sizes. The PCA Scores range from +1t o21. Thus,
the vertical axis shows the number of rats in each bin, and the horizontal axis the PCA Score. Note that PCA Score reveals two subpopulations of
animals by Days 4 and 5 of training.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038987.g003
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These plots indicate that rats with PCA Index Scores below 20.5
or above +0.5 had more than 50% ONLY trials and less than 50%
BOTH trials. In contrast, rats with Index scores between 0.5 and
20.5 had a majority of BOTH trials and less than 50% ONLY
trials. Thus, for the purpose of further analyses we chose to class
animals as STs if they had a PCA Index Score from +0.5 to +1,
and GTs if they had a score from 20.5 to 21. Using this criterion
a ST or GT engaged in sign- or goal-tracking, respectively, twice
as much as the other behavior. The remaining rats were classified
as intermediates (INs; scores from 20.49 to 0.49). Note that this
cut-off for classifying animals is somewhat arbitrary and more or
less stringent criteria may be adopted depending on the
experiment [e.g., 24,28].
Using these criteria for classification, the number of BOTH,
ONLY, and NONE trials for STs, INs, and GTs are shown in
Fig. 5C. On average, STs and GTs performed only their
predominant response on .80% of the trials and had relatively
few BOTH and NONE trials. INs had similar numbers of BOTH
and ONLY trials, which indicates that they tended to vacillate
within trials as well as between trials. This is further supported by
Fig. 5D, which shows the number of ONLY, BOTH, and NONE
trials in INs, subdivided by whether they had positive (i.e.,
tendency to sign-track) or negative (i.e. tendency to goal-track)
PCA Index Scores. There are no major differences in the total
number of ONLY, BOTH, or NONE trials between IN rats with
positive vs. negative scores. However, on ONLY trials, INs with
positive PCA Index Scores most often directed their response
towards the lever, whereas INs with negative PCA Index Scores
typically made their response towards the food cup (insert, Fig. 5D).
Using the PCA Index to Quantify the Distribution of Sign-
and Goal-tracking Phenotypes
Next, we calculated PCA Index Scores for all the 1,878 rats in
our sample, and using the criteria described above, classed them as
STs, GTs or INs. Using this criterion, and this relatively large
sample of the population, we found that 657 (35%) were STs, 650
(35%) were IN, and 571 (30%) were GTs (Fig. 6). The behavior of
rats classed in this way across the 5 days of training is shown in
Fig. 7. As expected, there were robust differences in all three
measures of Pavlovian conditioned approach behavior, with STs
showing increases in the measures of sign-tracking concomitant
with a decrease in the goal-tracking measures. The reverse was
true for GTs, while INs displayed intermediate values.
It is important to note that learning either a ST CR or GT CR
requires CS-US pairings. Animals for which the CS and US are
presented in an unpaired fashion (n=51), do not learn either CR
(Fig. 8), as reported previously [9,15,25,27,34]. However, this does
not address whether goal-tracking is associated with a general
increase in magazine entries, even during the ITI periods. We
determined whether GTs discriminated between the CS and non-
CS periods by comparing head entries made by STs and GTs
during the non-CS period (when the lever was not extended). Fig. 9
shows the frequency of head entries during the CS and non-CS
periods in STs and GTs. GTs entered the food cup more
frequently than STs during the non-CS period. However, GTs
clearly discriminated the CS and non-CS periods, evidenced by a
Table 2. Correlations between Lever Contacts, CS Food Cup Entries, Inter-trial Interval (ITI) Food Cup Entries, and the PCA Scores
on Day 1 (top) and Day 5 (bottom) of Pavlovian training.
Day 1 Lever Contacts CS Food Cup Entries ITI Food Cup Entries
Lever Contacts (1) 20.03
CS Food Cup Entries (1) 20.18 0.74
PCA Index 0.43 20.11 0.00
Day 5 Lever Contacts (5) CS Food Cup Entries (5) ITI Food Cup Entries (5)
Lever Contacts (5) 20.25
CS Food Cup Entries (5) 20.58 0.47
PCA Index 0.81 20.81 20.36
Legend: Numbers indicate Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r) and those that are Italicized numbers indicate statistically significant correlations (ps,0.01) are italicized.
The number inside parentheses denotes the day of Pavlovian training.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038987.t002
Figure 4. The PCA Score is strongly correlated with lever- and
food cup-directed behavior on the final day of training.
Selected scatterplots of correlations reported in Table 2 are shown.
Each symbol represents an individual animal. The top panels show the
number of lever contacts plotted as a function of the PCA Score on Day
1 (A) and Day 5 (B) of Pavlovian training. The bottom panels show the
number of head entries into the food cup, during the 8 s CS period
(during which time the lever was inserted into the chamber), plotted as
a function of the PCA Score on Day 1 (C) and Day 5 (D) of training.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038987.g004
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with a large increase in CS entries. Also, by the end of training,
GTs make head entries much more frequently during the CS
period than during the non-CS period.
Predicting Conditioned Reinforcement with the PCA
Index
To further test the effectiveness of the PCA Index method to
predict the propensity of animals to attribute incentive salience to
reward cues we determined how well it predicts individual
variation in this trait when it is assessed using a different
behavioral measure of incentive salience attribution. Robinson
and Flagel [9] first reported that a lever-CS serves as a better
conditioned reinforcer in STs than GTs, and this effect has now
been reported in two additional studies [25,34]. Data from
Lomanowska et al. [25] were used to compare the effectiveness of
the rank-order split and PCA Index methods to predict the ability
of the CS to act as a conditioned reinforcer. For the rank-order
split method, STs, INs, and GTs were classed by totaling the
number of lever contacts over 5 days of Pavlovian training and
dividing the sample of animals tested into thirds, as described
previously [9,32]. We compared this method with the PCA Index
described here (Table 1, Fig. 6). Fig. 10 shows that the correlation
between conditioned approach and conditioned reinforcement
obtained using the rank-order split method (Fig. 10A; r=0.53;
p,0.01) was not quite as strong as when the PCA Index Scores
Figure 5. Variation in the topography of the conditioned response from trial to trial as a function of PCA Index Score. This analysis is
based on a subset (n=370) of the total sample of animals. Behavioral responses on a given trial were classed as: (1) ONLY trials (a trial in which a rat
made only one or more lever deflections or only one or more food cup entries during the CS period, but not both); (2) BOTH trials (a trial in which an
animal made at least one lever deflection and one food cup entry in the same 8-s CS period); (3) NONE trials (trials in which there was neither a lever
deflection nor a food cup entry). Panels A and B show the percent of ONLY and BOTH trials for each rat, respectively, plotted as a function of the
animal’s PCA Index Score. Based on these data we classed the animals as sign-trackers (STs; a PCA Index Score of 0.5 or above), goal-trackers (GTs; a
score of 20.5 or less), or intermediates (INs; scores from 20.49 to +0.49). Panel C shows the proportion of ONLY, BOTH, and NONE trials for STs, INs,
and GTs. Panel D shows a more detailed analysis of the Intermediates. The INs are subdivided into those with positive vs. negative PCA Index Scores.
This does not have much effect of the percent of ONLY, BOTH or NONE trials, but the inset shows that INs with positive scores (towards sign-tracking)
typically press the lever on ONLY trials, and those with negative PCA Index Scores typically make food cup entries.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038987.g005
Figure 6. The distribution of PCA Index Scores in a sample of
1,878 rats. STs, GTs and INs are classed according to the
criteria presented in Fig. 5. It is clear, based on these criteria, that
STs and GTs represent different subpopulations of animals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038987.g006
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PCA Index classification method is an effective predictor of
conditioned reinforcement. In further support, we also reclassified
rats used in the Robinson and Flagel study (see Fig. 3 in [9]) using
the PCA Index, and found a very similar correlation between the
PCA Index Scores and the measure of conditioned reinforcement
(r=0.64; p,0.001; data not shown), replicating the results shown
in Fig. 10. In summary, the PCA Index strongly predicts the
tendency to attribute incentive salience to a food cue, even when
assessed using a completely different measure of incentive salience
attribution (i.e., conditioned reinforcement), and in an instrumen-
tal rather than Pavlovian setting.
Discussion
The idea that the incentive motivational properties of reward-
associated cues are especially important in controlling behavior
has a long history [2,4,12,13,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43]. How-
ever, in many studies examining the control of behavior by reward
cues it is often assumed (either explicitly or implicitly) that the
conditional relationship between a stimulus (CS) and a reward
(US) is sufficient to confer incentive motivational properties to the
CS. That is, if a CS is capable of evoking a conditioned response
(CR) it also has the ability to act as an incentive stimulus. We
suggest this is not the case.
The data presented here show that, in fact, there is considerable
individual variation in the extent to which a perfectly effective CS
acquires the properties of an incentive stimulus. We report, using a
large sample of the population (N=1,878 rats), that a food cue
becomes powerfully attractive, reliably eliciting approach towards
it, in only about 35% of animals. That is, based on a measure of
one property of an incentive stimulus (attraction/approach), only a
subset of the population attributed the food cue with sufficient
incentive salience for it to become powerfully attractive. Impor-
Figure 7. Mean ± SEM number of lever deflections (A) or food
cup entries (B), probability of approaching the lever (C) or food
cup (D) during the CS period, and latency to contact the lever
(E) or make a food cup entry (F) during the CS period, over 5
days of Pavlovian training in 1,878 rats classed as STs, GTs or
INs, as described in Fig. 6. Note that the SEM is smaller than the
symbol in most cases.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038987.g007
Figure 8. Animals in which the CS and US are presented but not
paired do not learn either a ST or GT CR. (A) The mean (6 SEM)
number of lever presses in STs and the Unpaired group (UN) and (B) CS
food cup entries in GTs and the Unpaired group. The data are
reanalyzed from Robinson & Flagel [9], and STs and GTs were re-classed
based on the PCA Index.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038987.g008
Figure 9. Mean (SEMs are occluded by the symbols) frequency
of food cup entries (entries/s) during the CS period vs.
intertrial (ITI) periods in sign-trackers (STs) and goal-trackers
(GTs) over five days of Pavlovian training. The STs and GTs are
those shown in Fig. 6 and 7. The data illustrate that GTs discriminate CS
vs. non-CS periods, selectively increasing head entries during the CS
period as a function of Pavlovian training.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038987.g009
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cue becomes itself desired (another property of an incentive
stimulus), based on whether animals will perform a new
instrumental response to get it (i.e., to act as a conditioned
reinforcer; Fig. 9 and [9,25,34]). The correlation between the PCA
Index Score and conditioned reinforcement ranged from r=+0.62
to +0.64 in data reanalyzed from two independent studies [9,25].
A similar association between PCA and conditioned reinforcement
has been reported in two selectively-bred lines of rats that differ
markedly in their propensity to approach a food cue [34]. We have
also reported that a food cue is more effective in reinstating food-
seeking behavior after extinction of the instrumental response in
rats that find the food cue attractive (STs), relative to rats that are
not attracted to a food cue (GTs) [26].
We suggest, therefore, that the predictive value of a CS,
required for it to evoke a CR, is not sufficient to confer incentive
value. That is, a CS is not necessarily also an incentive stimulus.
The attribution of incentive salience to a reward cue, which is
necessary for it to acquire Pavlovian conditioned motivational
properties, requires additional processes [10,34,44,45,46]. This is
an important distinction, because only if reward cues acquire
incentive motivational properties will they also acquire the ability
to exert strong control over motivated behavior, and thus the
ability to potentially instigate maladaptive behavior.
This notion is further supported by reports that the attractive-
ness of a food cue predicts the extent to which a drug (cocaine) cue
acquires incentive motivational properties, based on a number of
different measures [27,29,30,31,47]. Thus, relative to GTs, STs
are more likely to approach a cocaine cue [27,28], they work
harder for cocaine [29], and show greater cue-induced and
cocaine-primed reinstatement following extinction of self-admin-
istration behavior [29,30]. Furthermore, only STs develop a
preference for a cocaine-associated tactile cue in a conditioned cue
preference procedure, and emit frequency-modulated 50 KHz
ultrasonic vocalizations in the presence of the cocaine cue [31].
Finally, a cocaine cue is more important in maintaining cocaine
self-administration behavior in STs than GTs [30,48].
It is important to emphasize that both the ST CR and GT CR
are learned responses, acquired with experience, and both STs
and GTs learn their respective CRs at a comparable rate (Fig. 7
and Fig. 9). For both STs and GTs, pairing the CS and US
increased the probability of approach during the CS period, to
either the cue or the goal, respectively. It increased the vigor with
which they engaged the cue or the goal, and it increased the
rapidity with which they approached their respective targets upon
CS onset (Fig. 7). In addition, if the food cue is not explicitly paired
with food delivery, rats fail to learn either a ST or GT CR (Fig. 8;
[9], [25], [27]). Furthermore, we have trained animals for up to 22
days and the ST, GT and intermediate phenotypes remain
dissociated and stable [9]. Finally, STs and GTs do not differ
systematically in learning other food-reinforced tasks [9,26].
Therefore, it is clear that the cue (CS) acts as a predictor,
providing the information necessary to support learning the CS-
US association equally in STs and GTs. We suggest that the
difference in the topography of the CR reflects the extent to which
the CS is attributed with incentive salience (see below for more
discussion).
Advantages of the PCA Index Score in Estimating
Individual Variation in the Propensity to Attribute
Incentive Salience to Reward Cues
Incentive stimuli are defined by their ability to attract, become
‘wanted’, and generate a conditioned motivational state [4], as
assessed using PCA, conditioned reinforcement, and Pavlovian-to-
Instrumental transfer (PIT) tests [17,49,50,51]. Although these
features collectively define an incentive stimulus, it is important to
note that they are themselves psychologically and neurobiologi-
cally dissociable [e.g., 39,52,53,54]. Nevertheless, in order to
estimate the propensity to attribute incentive salience to reward
cues, we have focused on PCA rather than conditioned
reinforcement or PIT, for three reasons. First, PCA is procedurally
Figure 10. The propensity to approach a lever-CS predicts the ability of the same lever-CS to support learning a new instrumental
response to get it (i.e., the ability of the lever-CS to act as a conditioned reinforcer). Data from Lomanowska et al. [25] were used to
compare the effectiveness of the rank-order split and PCA Index methods to predict the ability of the CS to act as a conditioned reinforcer. For the
rank-order split method, rats were classed as STs and GTs by totaling the number of lever contacts over 5 days of Pavlovian training and dividing the
sample of animals tested into thirds. Panel A shows the correlation between active nose-pokes (minus inactive nose-pokes) on the test for
conditioned reinforcement, as a function of total lever contacts. Panel B shows the same data, but when each animal’s PCA Index Score was
calculated and used to class animals. In both Panels red filled symbols indicate GTs, white symbols INs, and blue filled symbols STs, classed the two
different ways. Horizontal lines depict group means. (Note that the sample sizes differ for the groups between the two methods; an equal number of
STs and GTs cannot be assumed when using the PCA Index.).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038987.g010
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measure conditioned reinforcement or PIT, individuals must first
undergo Pavlovian training anyway, which may obviate the need
for additional tests. Also, PCA does not involve discrimination or
instrumental learning, as with the other tasks. Second, for assessing
PIT, auditory cues are usually used, but these elicit only goal-
tracking [55,56,57] and do not acquire incentive properties
differentially in STs and GTs [58]. Localizable visual cues are
problematic in typical PIT experiments because such cues can
elicit sign-tracking, pulling an animal away from the instrumental
manipulandum, thus interfering with transfer. Finally, conditioned
reinforcement and PIT effects are often transient and fragile,
which may be because these tests are conducted in the absence of
reward and therefore are subject to extinction processes.
In a number of previous studies we [9,25,26,27,30,31,32,33,58]
and others [59] have classed rats as STs or GTs based on the
number of lever contacts alone, typically dividing relatively small
samples of the population into thirds based on the total number of
lever contacts over five days of training (the ‘‘rank-order split’’
method). With this procedure it is assumed that the tendency to
sign-track is inversely related to the tendency to goal-track. This is
partially true: sign-tracking and goal-tracking are indeed inversely
correlated (Table 2), but this is not a perfect correlation
(r=20.58). The rank-order split method would presumably
identify rats that did not interact with the lever, but a rat that
made 15 lever contacts and 100 CS magazine entries during a
session would be ranked the same as a rat who made 15 lever
contacts and 0 magazine entries. Making each of the Index
components a subtraction score, in which each measure of goal-
tracking is subtracted from the related measure of sign-tracking,
solves this problem and places equal emphasis on sign- and goal-
tracking.
Another major advantage of using the PCA Index Score
developed here in a very large sample is that small groups, or even
single animals, can be classed as a ST, IN, or GT, as long as
similar training procedures are used. This can be helpful for
studies with low samples sizes, like many neurobiological studies.
This would not be possible with the rank-order split method.
Furthermore, the PCA Index is insensitive to differences between
samples. For example, a given small group of rats arriving from the
supplier could, by chance, all have PCA Index Scores above 0.5,
and the rank-order split method would erroneously identify some
of these rats as GTs. Indeed, we have found there is sometimes
considerable variation in the prevalence of STs vs. GTs, both
between batches of rats purchased from the same supplier, and
between batches purchased from different suppliers. These effects
may be dependent on the breeding and selection practices of
commercial suppliers as well as differential allelic frequency
changes within isolated populations. It could also be due to
differences in how animals are handled prior to shipment, or
during shipment, or to when the rats were weaned (which may
vary considerably; M. Marinelli, personal communication), as
early life experience is known to influence the propensity to show
sign-tracking vs. goal-tracking in adulthood [25,60]. Therefore,
the PCA Index method increases reliability by allowing the
comparison of an individual’s performance relative to a large
sample of the population.
At first glance, it may seem redundant to include three highly
correlated measures for calculation of the PCA Index. Response
bias, probability difference, and latency difference are strongly
correlated on Day 5 (r’s.0.93). For example, rats that contact the
lever quickly (short latency) are likely to have a greater response
bias for the lever (many overall lever contacts). We included all
three measures of approach so that, when PCA is used as a
classification process, the PCA index would be less sensitive to
random fluctuations in one of the measures. However, when PCA
is the endpoint of an experiment, certain experimental manipu-
lations may alter one of these measurements differentially. In this
case, the three measure of approach should be examined
independently. For example, some rats may engage the lever only
briefly, immediately after CS onset, while engaging the food cup
for the remainder of the CS period. In this manner, response bias
would be more sensitive to the goal-tracking aspect of the
behavior, and would thus be dissociated from latency to food
cup entry and probability. An experimental treatment that
resulted in an increase in vacillation between sign- and goal-
tracking could produce such a dissociation. For example, lateral
striatal lesions produce response-bias alterations with no effect on
response latency in a visual discrimination task; the reverse is true
for medial striatal lesions [61]. This suggests that latency and
response bias in general are subserved by distinct neurobiological
processes, and this may be true for conditioned approach as well.
In addition, non-food USs, such as drugs or rewarding electrical
brain stimulation, may produce rapid approach, but very little
physical interaction with a lever-CS [62,63,64,65]. The PCA
Index would be sensitive to changes such as these, although it
would need to be adapted to measure approach to the cue,
independent of physically engaging it (e.g., using video-based
proximity analysis). Lastly, the application of the PCA Index can
be used to compare more accurately the results across studies and
laboratories where procedures may vary. For example, by using
the PCA Index, studies using variable number of trials per session
(e.g., 25 vs. 40), variable CS durations (e.g., 5s vs. 8s vs. 10s) or
even more days of training can be more accurately compared.
Previous approaches emphasizing raw numbers of CS contacts
and magazine entries are difficult to compare if the number of
trials or other variables are not consistent across studies.
State versus Trait?
We have suggested that the PCA Index is useful in assessing a
complex psychological trait, which we have defined as the propensity
to attribute incentive salience to discrete, localizable reward cues, and that it
indicates that there are two major behavioral phenotypes: STs,
which refers to animals prone to attribute incentive salience to
localizable reward cues, and GTs, which are less prone to do so.
We define propensity as an inclination or natural tendency to
behave in a certain way, and we suggest that this propensity is
consistent across situations. However, that this is only a tendency
underlines that there are situations in which the individual
differences in this propensity may not be evident. An important
issue to consider, therefore, is whether the ST/GT distinction
revealed by the PCA Index described here does in fact represent a
stable complex psychological trait, or only transitory ‘‘states’’
expressed under specific conditions. First, it is critical to emphasize
that the psychological trait of interest is not sign-tracking or goal-
tracking behavior per se. Rather, a ST CR and GT CR represent
only two of a number of possible behavioral measures associated
with the underlying psychological trait. We use the terms ‘‘STs’’
and ‘‘GTs’’ as a short-hand to refer to individuals that not only
differ in attraction to a reward cue, but also show other behavioral
differences indicative of incentive salience attribution to cues,
including those assessed with measures of conditioned reinforce-
ment and conditioned motivation [4,10,11,17,49,50,51]. We
assume this trait, like all complex psychological traits, is
determined by gene X environment interactions, although the
genetic or epigenetic basis of the trait and the critical environ-
mental determinants are unknown [although see 60,66,67]. Below
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individuals that express two different behavioral phenotypes.
1. The two phenotypes are heritable. In rat lines
selectively bred for their locomotor response to a novel environ-
ment, the propensity to attribute incentive salience to reward cues
(as assessed with multiple measures on multiple tests — not just ST
behavior) also segregated [27,34]. That the HR/LR and ST/GT
traits co-segregated suggests a partial genetic overlap at best,
because there is no relationship between these two phenotypes in
outbred rats [9,48]. Nevertheless, the fact ST/GT was subject to
selection across generations is evidence for heritability. Further,
these studies confirmed that the ST/GT phenotype is associated
with behavioral responses in drug-conditioning paradigms and in
measures of impulsivity [27]. In these studies, the animals were not
trained in the PCA paradigm but were identified as STs and GTs
based on their breeding history. Therefore, these phenotypes are
not a consequence of PCA training itself [34].
2. It is modified by early experience. We have shown that
early life (preweaning) adversity increases the proportion of STs in
the population [25]. Complementary to this finding is the report
by Beckmann & Bardo [60] showing that post-weaning isolation
also increases the likelihood of sign-tracking while post-weaning
rearing in complex (‘enriched’) environment increases the prob-
ability of goal-tracking. Thus, these findings suggest a gene X
environment interaction, as is typical for complex psychological
traits.
3. The phenotypes are stable and predictive. As we
report here, and elsewhere [9,25], performance on one task (e.g., a
ST CR) reliably predicts performance on others indicative of the
trait, assessed at a different time and using very different
procedures (Fig. 10). The propensity to approach reward cues
not only predicts the ability of a cue to act as conditioned
reinforcer [9], and to reinstate behavior [26], but also the
behavioral responses to very different cues (e.g., a cocaine cue) that
have acquired incentive value in an instrumental, rather than a
Pavlovian setting [29,30]. ST behavior even predicts responses to a
fear cue [68]. Also, a ST CR is stable over at least 22 days of
testing [9], and is intact after six weeks without additional PCA
training (PJM, unpublished data). There is considerable evidence,
therefore, that expression of the traits is not idiosyncratic to one
testing situation - it is manifest in many different tests.
4. The two phenotypes are associated with biological
differences. This requires much more work but we have
identified differences between STs and GTs in dopamine systems
and HPA axis responsivity, and different patterns of immediate-
early gene expression in cortical-striatal-thalamic brain regions
[14,32,34,69].
5. The two phenotypes are associated with other traits in
a predictable and logical way. STs tend to be impulsive on
tests of impulsive action, but interestingly, not on tests of impulsive
choice [27,66]. In addition, Beckmann et al. [48] have reported
that STs also tend to show greater novelty-seeking behavior. It is
worth noting, however, that although significantly related,
variance on a test of impulsive action only accounts for about
15% of the variance on a test of attraction to a food cue. This
means some STs will be impulsive, but others may not. It may be
that it will be those individuals who are prone to attribute incentive
salience to reward cues, and have poor top-down cognitive control
(resulting in impulsivity), and are novelty-seekers, who will be
especially vulnerable to develop impulse-control disorders, such as
addiction [70,71].
6. Similar behavioral propensities are seen in humans [72] and
are related to genetic variants [73,74,75].
Of course, we readily acknowledge that whether sign-tracking
or goal-tracking behavior is expressed in a given context is strongly
influenced by situational factors [15,17]. Indeed, the context can
be structured so that all animals develop a GT CR. For example,
rats generally will not learn to approach an auditory cue paired
with food delivery [58,76]. Thus, if a tone is used as the CS, all rats
learn a GT CR and the tone-CS is equally effective as a
conditioned reinforcer in STs and GTs [58]. This indicates that
GTs are not just generally impaired in their ability to attribute
incentive salience to reward cues, as they do so perfectly fine in
some situations. However, if a situation is structured such that STs
do not show ST behavior (e.g., using auditory cues that are
difficult to localize) this does not mean that the underlying trait is
not present or stable. Conversely, the PCA paradigm could be
altered to enhance the prevalence of sign-tracking, thereby
creating a state in which a majority of subjects attribute significant
incentive value to a specific cue. But this does not necessarily alter
the underlying trait. In other words, environmental factors may
determine whether any given trait is expressed at any given time or
in any given situation, as is the case for all complex psychological
traits.
What are the Psychological Processes Involved in Sign-
and Goal-tracking?
Sign- and goal-tracking are both forms of appetitive learning,
but recent neurobiological studies suggest that they are subserved
by different neural systems, and therefore, presumably different
psychological processes. What might these processes be?
While reward expectation may play a role in the goal-tracking
response (see next paragraph), a non-reinforced behavior such
sign-tracking cannot be due to expectancy alone [5,35,58]. In
addition, sign-tracking is not a case of simple stimulus substitution,
because it depends on the nature of the cue, the status of the
reward, and the physiological drive state [77,78,79,80,81]. The
available evidence suggests that sign-tracking is a behavioral
manifestation of Pavlovian incentive motivational processes, which
occur as a result of a multiplicative interaction between the
transfer of incentive value to the cue and the physiological drive
state [2,11,12,44,46,82,83]. That incentive for cues and their
associated rewards is dissociable is supported by neurobiological
investigations of sign-tracking. For example, the learning and
expression of sign-tracking (but not goal-tracking) are blocked by
dopamine antagonists [34,84,85,86]. In addition, sign-tracking
(but not goal-tracking) is associated with the transfer of a phasic
dopamine signal from the US to the CS in the nucleus accumbens
[34]. This involvement of the mesolimbic dopamine system is
consistent with sign-tracking reflecting the output of a bottom-up,
unconscious motivational process that is associated with impulsiv-
ity and poorly controlled by top-down cognitive processes, which
may involve corticostriatal projections [66,87,88].
Toates [12] has suggested that Pavlovian incentive processes
can occur simultaneously alongside cognitive processes resulting in
goal-directed behaviors, such as goal-tracking. At first glance, it
may seem that goal-tracking is also dependent on dopamine,
because others have reported that dopamine antagonists block the
goal-tracking response in a PCA paradigm [55,56]. However,
these studies measured the response to an auditory cue, as opposed
to visual cues used in studies of sign-tracking. This is a key
consideration, because while goal-tracking in response to an
auditory cue appears to be dependent on dopamine, goal-tracking
in response to a discrete visual cue is not [34,84,89]. In addition,
when trained with a compound visual/auditory stimulus, the
auditory component induced goal-tracking in both STs and GTs,
and was also an equally effective conditioned reinforcer for both.
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trackers [58]. Therefore, learning to goal-track in response to a
visual cue is unique in that it is dopamine independent. However,
there is little information from studies of Pavlovian incentive
learning regarding the psychological and neurobiological sub-
strates of this goal-tracking CR.
Studies of instrumental incentive learning may provide some
clues. Dickinson [90] used the term ‘‘act-outcome’’ learning to
suggest that individuals have a cognitive understanding of the
results of their actions. In this sense, behavior is mediated by the
explicit expectation of the outcome [91,92]. This form of act-
outcome learning requires a cortico-striatal system that is distinct
from the mesolimbic dopamine system involved in Pavlovian
incentive learning [55,93,94]. Further, as Toates [12] suggested,
expectancy-based and Pavlovian forms of incentive learning can
occur in tandem. For example, studies by Corbit, Balleine, and
colleagues [95,96,97] have examined the role of several brain
areas in two varieties of PIT. In the ‘‘general’’ form, a Pavlovian
CS energized responding for a multiple food rewards. In the
‘‘outcome-specific’’ form, the CS only energized responding for
the same reward that it was paired with. Only the ‘‘general’’ form
is affected by a shift from hunger to satiation [95], and was
dependent on the nucleus accumbens core and the central nucleus
of the amygdala [96,97], which are two critical areas involved in
sign-tracking [84,86,98]. Therefore, sign- and goal-tracking may
be analogous to the processes engaged by the general and
outcome-specific forms of PIT, respectively, which is paralleled by
their differential dependence of mesolimbic dopamine. If true,
then this would indicate that goal-tracking is a function of a
stimulus-outcome expectancy that involves cortical areas such as
the prefrontal and insular cortices [99]. This possibility is
supported indirectly by two recent studies showing that 1) c-fos
mRNA expression was correlated in the cortico-striatal circuit in
GTs but not STs [24], and 2) goal-trackers display better
attentional control during a sustained attention task; performance
in this task is controlled by cholinergic systems within the
prefrontal cortex and basal forebrain [87,100]. Further, this
dissociation between Pavlovian incentive salience and stimulus-
outcome expectancies may be paralleled by different computa-
tional constructs of incentive salience attribution [which may
describe sign-tracking; 44,45,101]. Future studies are clearly
required to test these hypotheses.
The Irresistibility of Reward Cues Can Lead to
Maladaptive Behavior
One of the most remarkable features of sign-tracking is that
reward-related cues can become so irresistibly attractive that they
produce seemingly maladaptive and arguably compulsive behavior
that delays or leads to the loss of the primary reward
[17,20,102,103,104]. For example, Hearst and Jenkins [17], tested
pigeons in a long box in which a key light on one end of the box
preceded delivery of food at the other end, and the pigeons would
traverse the length of the box and peck on the key light although
this had no effect on the probability of food delivery. Most
remarkably, if the food were only available for a short period of
time, such that walking to the far end of the box would result in
loss of the reward, the pigeons continued to peck the key light.
Another example comes from studies using an ‘‘omission
schedule’’, whereby contact with the CS results in omission of
the reward. Despite the potential loss of reward, animals will
continue to approach and sometimes contact the CS [104]. A final
example comes from studies in quail in which a terrycloth-covered
object was used as the CS and presentation of a female (to male
quail) as the US. With training some male quail came to approach,
mount and even copulate with the terrycloth object, and some of
these, ‘‘were often observed to continue copulating with the CS
even after the female was released’’ [105]. The CS acquired such
powerful incentive motivational properties that it was preferred
over a real female! These examples vividly demonstrate just how
irresistibly attractive incentive stimuli can become, and how
powerfully they can control behavior. They also indicate that
approach behavior is not maintained by ‘‘accidental reinforce-
ment’’ of an action, or ‘‘superstitious’’ behavior
[15,20,106,107,108].
Given the apparently maladaptive nature of sign-tracking
behavior in these laboratory situations one can ask why such a
large proportion of animals develop this response. Presumably, the
answer is that in environments in which animals evolved, sign-
tracking behavior is often adaptive. Stimuli in the environment
that are associated with reward delivery or location help organisms
obtain rewards such as food. In most situations, cues predictive of
reward would be located at the same place where the reward itself
is to be found. A strong tendency to approach such cues (sign-
track) would bring the animal into close proximity of the food, and
increase the probability of obtaining it, even if the food were
concealed. For example, an effective strategy for a hungry bird
looking for a worm would be to peck a worm-hole, even if the
worm is not immediately visible. Rapidly approaching reward cues
would also increase the probability that a given animal, rather
than another individual competing for similar resources, would get
the reward. Thus, in many contexts (but presumably not all) sign-
tracking would be an adaptive strategy [22,109,110,111]. It could
be argued that sign-tracking only leads to maladaptive behavior in
laboratory situations when the cue is deliberately located at a place
some distance from the location of reward delivery. However, in
humans, it may also lead to maladaptive behavior in modern
environments, where an abundance of signs (cues) predict the
availability of inordinately large amounts of rich, high fat and/or
sugary foods. It may also lead to maladaptive behavior when cues
predict inordinately powerful rewards, such as drugs.
The idea that incentive stimuli are important in controlling
behavior in humans, and may contribute to maladaptive behavior,
is well established [112,113,114,115,116,117,118]. For example,
there are many studies showing that food-associated cues can
evoke desire for food, and this is thought to contribute to some
eating disorders [119,120]. Indeed, Beaver et al. [73] report that
individuals who score high on a ‘‘Behavioral Activation Scale
(BAS)’’, thought to assess the propensity for appetitive motivation,
‘‘experience more frequent and intense food cravings and are
more likely to be overweight or develop eating disorders associated
with excessive food intake’’, and this is associated with greater
activation of mesocorticostriatal circuits in response to images of
food. Indeed, there are numerous similarities in the brain regions
activated by food, sexual, and drug cues [118,121,122].
In the case of drugs, it is well-established that drug-users are
attracted to drug cues [70,123], their attention is biased towards
them [71,124,125,126] and they preferentially choose them [114].
In cocaine dependent subjects the extent to which cocaine cues
disrupted performance in the Stroop Task even predicted
treatment outcomes [127]. Drug cues also support responding
on a second order schedule of reinforcement in humans similar to
that observed in non-human animals [128]. Many studies have
established that drug cues can evoke craving and/or relapse
[115,129,130]. Although there has been some debate concerning
the relationship between craving and relapse, a recent study of
drug users in their normal living environment found that, ‘‘cocaine
craving is tightly coupled to cocaine use’’ [131]. Interestingly,
Mahler and de Wit [72] recently reported that smokers who
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also showed the highest craving when presented with smoking cues
after a period of abstinence from cigarettes.
In addicts, drug cues activate mesocorticolimbic circuits known
to be important in mediating the incentive motivational properties
of reward cues [132,133,134]. Indeed, even words related to drug
use are sufficient to activate brain motive circuits [135], as are
‘‘unseen cues’’ [118]. The latter finding is interesting because it
suggests implicit drug cues, outside of conscious awareness, are
sufficient to activate brain motive circuits. This is important
because, as put by Childress et al. [118]:
‘‘By the time the motivational state is experienced and labeled as
conscious desire, the ancient limbic reward circuitry already has a
running start. This dilemma may be reflected not only our daily human
struggle to manage the pull of natural rewards such as food and sex, but
also in the chronic, treatment resistant disorders for which poorly
controlled desire is a cardinal feature (e.g., the addictions).’’
Finally, there is accumulating evidence for considerable
individual variation in the ability of cues to evoke motivational
states and activate mesocorticolimbic circuitry in humans, some of
which is due genetic variation [73,74,75,136,137]. It will be
important to determine if individual variation in the propensity to
attribute incentive salience to reward cues, as described here in
rats, is biologically related to similar variation in humans.
Materials and Methods
Subjects
1,878 adult male Sprague Dawley rats (200–300 g) were
purchased from Harlan or Charles River. Rats were handled
daily during the week leading up to testing and were given ,25
banana-flavored pellets (45 mg, BioServ; Frenchtown, NJ) in their
home cages (to familiarize them with the pellets) for two days prior
to testing. The rats were tested by six different laboratory members
from Terry Robinson’s laboratory over the course of six years
(2004–2010). In addition, the data shown in Fig. 10 were collected
by Anna Lomanowska and Vedran Lovic at the University of
Toronto – Mississauga; these rats were purchased from Charles
River. Otherwise, rats were treated identically as described below.
Data from previously published studies are included in the analysis
reported here [9,24,25,26,29,30,31,32,33,66,68,69], as well as
data from unpublished studies. Rats were given free access to food
and water when not in the conditioning chambers (i.e., they were
not food restricted). All experiments followed the principles of
laboratory animals care specified by ‘‘Guidelines for the Care and
Use of Mammals in Neuroscience and Behavioral Research’’
National Research Council (2003), and all procedures were
approved by the University Committee on the Use and Care of
Animals at the University of Michigan.
Apparatus
Conditioning chambers (20.5624.1 cm floor area, 29.2 cm
high; MED-Associates Inc., St. Albans, VT) were situated in sound
attenuating cubicles outfitted with ventilation fans. Each chamber
contained a red house light centered near the ceiling of one wall. A
food magazine was centered on the opposite wall and was flanked,
either to the left or right, by a retractable lever. When the lever
was inserted into the chamber the slot through which it protruded
could be illuminated by activating a LED mounted behind the
wall. A catch tray filled with corn-cob bedding was located
underneath the floor, which was constructed from stainless steel
rods. Chambers were controlled by MED-PC software.
Pretraining
In our earlier studies pretraining consisted of two daily sessions
in which rats were placed into the chamber for five minutes, after
which time the red house light was illuminated and 50 banana-
flavored food pellets were delivered on a Variable Time (VT) 30 s
schedule (i.e., one pellet was delivered on average every 30 s, but
the exact time varied randomly between 1–60 s). The lever was
always retracted during these sessions. Rats were returned to their
home cages immediately after the session. Rats that did not eat all
the pellets by the end of the second session, which occurred in
,1% of rats, were not tested further. In later studies we found that
this pretraining period could be reduced to a single session in
which the rats received 25 pellets instead of 50, so some animals
were pretrained using this schedule. This was sufficient to
familiarize them with the magazine (it was very rare that rats
did not eat all the pellets during this phase). Approximately 1,000
rats were tested using the 2-day procedure while the remainder
were tested using the 1-day procedure.
Pavlovian Conditioning Procedure
On the day following the pretraining session(s), rats underwent
five daily sessions of Pavlovian training. One minute after rats
were placed into the chamber, illumination of the red house light
signaled the beginning of the session, and the house light was left
on throughout the entire session. The lever was inserted into the
chamber for 8 s, and during this time the LED located behind the
lever was illuminated. After 8 s the lever was retracted, the light
extinguished, and a food pellet was immediately delivered into the
adjacent food cup. Each training session consisted of twenty-five
lever-pellet pairings using a VT-90 s schedule (i.e., presentation of
the CS and US varied randomly between 30–150 s, with an
average of 90 s). Each session lasted, on average, 37.5 min. Lever
presses were recorded when the rats deflected the lever, and food
cup entries were recorded as interruption of a photobeam across
the entrance to the food cup. Note that pellet delivery occurred
independent of the animal’s behavior. Rats were returned to their
home cages at the end of the session.
Conditioned Reinforcement Procedure
Some rats were also subjected to a 40-min test for conditioned
reinforcement. The data from these tests have been reported
previously [9,25], but are reanalyzed here. On the day after
Pavlovian training, as described above, rats were placed into the
conditioning chambers, but these were reconfigured. The food
magazine was removed and the lever was now positioned in its
place, in the center of the wall. Two nose-poke ports (2 cm
diameter; 2 cm above the floor), equipped with photocells, were
added, one on each side of the lever. One port was designated
‘‘Active’’ and the other ‘‘Inactive’’. When a rat made a nose poke
into the Active port the lever was extended into the chamber (and
illuminated) for 2–4 s. Nose pokes into the Inactive port had no
consequence This test occurred under extinction conditions, in
that no food pellets were delivered. The number of responses into
the ‘Active’ and ‘Inactive’ ports were recorded.
Data Analysis/Statistics
Lever deflections and magazine entries were recorded during
the CS and ITI periods for the five days of training. The values
were used to calculate the Response Bias, Latency Score;
Probability Difference, and PCA Index (see Results, Table 1).
Quantifying Incentive Salience Attribution to Cues
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 12 June 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 6 | e38987Descriptive statistics (means, frequency histograms, scatterplots)
were generated using Statistica (Tulsa, OK). Pearson’s product
moment correlations were calculated for the correlations presented
in Table 2 and Fig. 10.
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